China and Pakistan: the world’s highest border crossing. Photo by Pamir Times
Central Asia is emerging as a region that could test the influence of India and China. Although New Delhi is following Beijing’s lead and expanding into this resource-rich and strategically important region, it is set to play second fiddle.
Parts of this article were adapted from the authors’ “China and Central Asia: A Significant New Energy Nexus” in The European Financial Review, April 30, 2013, accessible here.
China’s trade and energy cooperation with Central Asia has been expanding over the last ten years. Photo by Sue Anne Tay
Over the past decade China has aggressively developed its energy cooperation with Central Asia, which has an abundance of oil and natural gas deposits, and relative political stability. Through its energy relationship with Central Asia, China not only diversifies its access to new energy sources but also gains greater flexibility in playing regional geopolitics that advances its broader national interests.
Russia-China joint anti terror training October 20, 2014. Photo by China Central TV
(Any opinions expressed here are those of the author and not of IHS Jane’s)
China’s northwestern Xinjiang province has again made headlines in 2014, largely because of a number of brutal attacks carried out by militants within the province’s Muslim Uighur population. Among the most notable attacks, 29 people were killed in a 1 March knife attack at a train station in Kunming; on 22 May, 39 people were killed in a market attack in Xinjiang’s capital, Ürümqi; and in July, the Chinese authorities reported that 59 “terrorists” and 37 civilians had been killed in Shache county during an attack on a police station, followed by the murder of a Uighur imam.
The death toll among the militants may, in reality, be much higher as a result of the authorities’ hardline security response. Although the Chinese government interprets such attacks as a product of religious extremism, many Uighurs view them as protests against the discrimination they experience at the hands of the authorities.
Shirkati Karim Ltd (private company), Chinese health centre. Picture by Umedjon Majidi
According to a poll conducted by the Sharq Research Centre (a Dushanbe-based think tank focusing on migration, economic, social and political issues in Tajikistan), Tajiks view China (the dragon) and India (the elephant) differently. According to results from the Sharq poll, people in Tajik cities in the early 2000s tended to look to India as a friendly nation while they saw China as a potential threat. Over a decade later, little has changed in these perceptions, with Tajiks continuing to view China predominantly with suspicion.
Xinjiang will soon see the launch of its first high-speed railway train that will run from Lanzhou city in neighboring Gansu province to Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. The government has hailed this as a significant move that will boost Xinjiang’s economy through more open trade, tourism and connectivity into Central Asia as part of the leadership’s vision of the new Silk Road Economic belt. Yet, the Guardian has countered that the high-speed railway in Xinjiang may end up exacerbating the growing economic inequality in the province.
Dushanbe’s local drivers have been complaining about the city government’s actions in organizing the head of states’ summit for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) which has just taken place on 14 September 2014. The complaints are numerous: The city’s second main street, Ismoil Somoni Avenue, is partially closed; the right lane of the roadway between the President’s Office and the Avicenna memorial is under renovation. This avenue connects with another main road in the city: Rudaki Avenue, where all government institutions are located. The city authorities informed local news agency Asia Plus that the roadway will be closed for 10-12 days; with an increasing number of cars in the city, local taxi drivers believe this could be dangerous for Dushanbe’s roads.
Xi and Modi meet for the first time in Brazil. Source: @PMOIndia
September is the busiest month for India’s foreign office. By the end of the month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will have visited Japan and the United States and hosted Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Chinese President Xi Jinping. In this list of big-ticket names, Mr Xi’s visit, scheduled for the 17th of this month, is the one diplomatic visit that is likely to be most closely watched.
For decades, harsh political realities have clouded Sino-Indian relations. China and India are nuclear-armed neighbours with a contested border running more than 3,000 kilometres. They went to war in 1962 over their border dispute. The countries have competing claims over Indian-administered Arunachal Pradesh – known as South Tibet in China – and military build-up continues on both sides. China’s tacit support for Pakistan has long been a cause for concern in India, while New Delhi’s sheltering of the Dalai Lama continues to irk Beijing. But with a new leadership at the helm in both countries, there is room for this relationship to improve. Continue reading →
Nestled in an area of Beijing populated by restaurants and shops identifiable mostly in Cyrillic, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) headquarters is housed in the old Japanese Embassy. It has the look of an in-progress refurbished building with plastic still covering the carpet. The member states’ flags flutter proudly outside the prominent entranceway, and an enormous gate surrounding the building is guarded attentively.
Since its inception as the Shanghai Five in 1996, the organisation’s main focus has been to stamp out the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Currently, the member states of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and (since 2001) Uzbekistan hold annual summits, at which they discuss matters of security, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and plans for joint military exercises. However, the exact substance of what goes on within the headquarters’ walls is not entirely clear. There are few visible members of personnel inside and a laid-back atmosphere prevails. Most significant strategic discussion-making appears to take place at the summits in regional capitals rather than at the Secretariat itself. This has left the SCO open to accusations of inefficiency and a lack of concrete action on its objectives. The organisation’s representatives announce actions and strategy in vague terms. But the SCO is not valueless. In light of the drawdown from Afghanistan, it has the potential to do much more to secure stability in the region.